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Abstract
In this paper we study a society in which individuals gain utility from income and
from social approbation. Income is correlated with class. Approbation is given to
an unobservable trait, which must be signalled through the agent’s social mobility,
i.e. class change. Mobility is driven by a simple mechanism involving inheritance,
eﬀort and ability. Thus social structure (class composition) is aﬀected by individuals’
quest for approbation, and we study how that aﬀects the emergence and multiplicity
of long run social organizations, including hybrid forms of dynasties and meritocra-
cies. Specifically we observe that even though social mobility is driven purely by a
meritocratic mechanism, pure dynasties can emerge. We then introduce a feedback
between the size of the upper class and its income value, so that eﬀort levels and
social structure are jointly endogenous. We derive results on equilibrium eﬀort levels
and stationary (when they exist) social structures. Social organization can converge
to a unique steady state, multiple long run equilibria or cycles.
1 Introduction
Most people get value from the approbation of others. The idea that our peers believe
we are “special” in some (positive) way tends to increase our utility levels. At the same
time there is a fairly natural tendency to grant this approbation when someone does seem
special. Diﬀerent societies, and one society at diﬀerent points in time, have diﬀerent ideas
∗We gratefully acknowledge comments from Avinash Dixit, Steve Durlauf, Alan Kirman, Barkley Rosser,
and other participants of the workshop “Networks, Aggregation and Markets” held in Marseilles, June
20 and 21, 2005. Bas Ter Weel and Fred Deroian also provided useful comments on an earlier draft.
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about what counts as special in this regard. In a caste society, or an old aristocracy, blood
is the key. Approbation is granted to those born into a high caste, and contempt to those
born in a low caste. In a pure meritocracy by contrast, approbation is granted to those with
merit: those who have skills and/or put in high eﬀort.1 Most modern societies are some
mix of both ideas, with the general thought that approbation based on merit is somehow
more modern. In any society, though, approbation does not come in infinite supplies. The
approbation mechanism ensures that if some people get more, others get less. A limited
supply is necessary to give approbation any value.
Some sources of approbation are readily visible: skill at basketball or movie acting,
for example, or the social status of one’s forebears. Others, such as intelligence, are not.
The former can simply be displayed; the latter must be signalled by some other means.
One means of signalling high skills of various kinds is to enter a social or income class
that diﬀers from one’s origin class, for example through a particular profession. Social
approbation follows. This is what this paper is about. We focus on attempts to acquire
public approbation through class mobility. Individuals try to signal their talent through
the application of eﬀort, which can result in a class change and the acquisition (or loss) of
status. This has long run consequences on social structure, and can also alter the values
attached to the classes themselves.
The observation that individuals compete for approbation from their peers is not new
(on the competition for approbation, status and other scarce social resources see Hirsch,
1976). In the literature on conspicuous consumption for instance, public approbation is
granted for the ownership of large wealth which, because it is not directly observable, is
signalled by heavy consumption of some positional good.2 In that literature what matters is
relative rather than absolute position. In Frank (1985a), Fershtman et al. (1996), or Funk
(1996) relative standing in some hierarchical structure enters the utility function directly.
In Frank (1985a) an individual’s utility increases with his position in the distribution of
consumption levels of the positional good. In Fershtman et al. (1996) an individual cares
about the average level of human capital in his occupation relative to that in the alternative
occupation. Alternatively, rankings can emerge from individuals’ desire to perform well in
some non-market tournament (such as access to social circles, clubs, marriage, and so on)
as in Cole et al. (1992) and Corneo and Jeanne (1998, 1999). There social recognition
obtains from marrying the right (high quality) mate or getting one’s oﬀspring to marry
the right mate, the probability of which is determined by relative performance in the social
contest. The desire for status is instrumental, arising endogenously from agents’ attempts to
manipulate a diﬀerent argument of the utility function. Ireland (1998) introduces “others”
into preferences in a slightly diﬀerent way: an agent’s utility is a convex combination of
his or her own fundamental utility, and spectators’ estimate of that utility.
Much of this literature concludes that in general the competition for status positions is
self-stultifying: if all agents make equivalent attempts to move up the hierarchy (buying cars
that are twice as big as their current ones), the result is simply an increase in the resources
spent in signalling, and no relative movement of agents within the hierarchy. Thus even
1“Meritocracy” was coined by Young (1958), and defined as a society in which recruitment to social
positions is based solely on merit, defined as the combination of ability and eﬀort.
2On conspicuous consumption see Marshall (1890), Smith (1776) and Veblen (1899). On status and
economic decisions, see the survey by Weiss and Fershtman (1998).
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if this behaviour generates growth in output, it generally does not raise aggregate welfare
and tends to constitute a social waste.3 In his model Funk (1996) argues that although
agents continually renew their status goods and so create continued demand and economic
accumulation, welfare does not increase, whereas Corneo and Jeanne (1998) find status-
seeking beneficial when it happens early in the life cycle.4
In the present paper we extend in several directions a framework initially provided in
Piketty (1998).5 Moving to, or staying in a high income class contributes to utility in two
ways: directly, through the utility of income; and instrumentally, in its contribution to
public approbation. Mobility is observed, and on that basis public beliefs about who de-
serves approbation are updated, and the updating mechanism creates a social competition
for approbation. Individual eﬀort-provision decisions thus have collective implications re-
garding the forms of social organization that can emerge. Depending on the importance of
the approbation motive and the prevalence of talent, a variety of organizations can emerge,
including hybrid forms of dynasties and meritocracies. In addition, we include a feedback
between approbation-seeking behaviour and the value from being in a particular class.
The central mechanism in the model is as follows. Social approbation is given to an
unobservable trait which must be signalled through the agent’s social mobility, and this
gives agents an incentive to try to enter or to stay in the high income class. Mobility
here is driven by a very simple mechanism involving inheritance, eﬀort and ability, and the
mechanism we employ mimics well the structures discussed in the empirical literature on
social mobility.6 In turn, upward mobility reduces the “market value” of the high class, as
entry drives down the income of members. While not reducing the value of the approbation
attached to the class, it does reduce the net inducement to attempt to enter, and so changes
the amount of entry to it. In general, this provides a regulating eﬀect on mobility and class
structure. Class structure and eﬀort thereby become jointly endogenous, and the type of
society that emerges, whether of self-made men, nouveaux riches arrivistes, or an Ancien
Re´gime aristocracy is driven by processes internal to the structure of social promotion
and demotion. Though the mechanism is simple, cycles, dynasties or meritocracy are all
possible outcomes, depending on the values of a few key parameters.
It is worth observing that in our model mobility is driven purely by meritocratic con-
cerns: if an agent has ability and works, he or she will rise (or stay in the top). Thus in
terms of motivation (incentives) agents live in a meritocratic system. Social promotion will
take place if an agent applies eﬀort to skill, and demotion will happen if eﬀort and skill
are lacking. An interesting result then is that under identifiable conditions a purely dy-
3A tax can provide a response to this over-consumption problem; see Ireland (1998).
4It is also possible to find a link between income distribution and the status-seeking activities, whereby
diﬀerences in taste for status among rich and poor induce diﬀerent investment decisions (in things such
as schooling) which can in turn further aﬀect income distribution and growth. See Weiss and Fershtman
(1998, section 3.4) on these issues.
5The concern in that paper revolves around the possibility that in two otherwise similar societies there
can be one in which agents actively seek status whereas in the other status-seeking behaviour is absent.
Besides multiplicity, Piketty also discusses the amplifying eﬀect of the status quest on initial inequalities.
6On the relative importance of class inheritance, ability and eﬀort for social mobility in the UK, see
Breen and Goldthorpe (1999) and Saunders (1997). On how these forces aﬀect social mobility more
generally, see for example, Treiman and Ganzeboom (1990), Breen and Goldthorpe (2001), Deardon et al.
(1997), Savage and Egerton (1997), Erikson and Goldthorpe (2002).
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nastic structure can emerge, in which all agents remain in the social class of their parents.
This suggests that defining or identifying a meritocracy is not simply a matter of observ-
ing inter-generational (non)mobility (cf. the debate between Saunders, 1997 and Breen
and Goldthorpe, 1999). A society in which all promotion is done purely on meritocratic
principles can still have a frozen social structure with no inter-generational mobility at all.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we present the basic model of
agents maximizing utility through choice of eﬀort level. Eﬀort, combined with randomly
assigned ability levels, determines whether the agent stays in his inherited origin class,
or moves to a diﬀerent destination class. In section 3 we derive results on eﬀort levels
for diﬀerent types of agents, and on the long run social class structure. In section 4 we
introduce social competition explicitly, by endogenizing incomes within a social class as a
function of the size of the class, deriving results on equilibrium eﬀort levels, class structure
and eﬃciency. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Society consists of two locations {0, 1}, the lower and upper classes respectively, which are
populated with a continuum S of individuals having total measure normalized to unity.
Each individual i ∈ S lives for one period during which he has a chance to move between
the two classes. Social mobility is influenced by three factors: the origin of i, `i ∈ {0, 1},
the ability of i, which can be high or low, ai ∈ {a,A}, and the level of eﬀort provided by
i, which can be high or low, ei ∈ {e,E}.
Individuals’ origins are inherited without error from their parents. Abilities are identi-
cally and independently distributed: independently from the abilities of other agents, and
independently of the social class of the agent.7 Specifically i’s ability ai is high with prob-
ability p ∈ (0, 1), which is known to everyone. Thus there is inter-generational inertia in
social class, but none in ability. Finally eﬀort can be thought of as educational investment
or harder work in the professional sphere and is, alone, under the control of the agent. De-
pending on these three factors an individual can stay in his or her origin class, be promoted
to the higher class or be demoted to the lower class.
Agents know their origin classes and know their own abilities. On the basis of expected
utility they choose eﬀort levels, and then “move” from `i to zi (possibly with zi equal to
`i). After all agents have moved, each collects the monetary payoﬀ r (zi) associated with
his or her destination class and public approbation. Individuals die after having given birth
to a single oﬀspring who is a member of his or her parent’s destination social class. The
process then simply iterates.
We look for steady states in eﬀort levels and class sizes, and how their properties are
aﬀected by parameters governing mobility.
2.1 Utility
Utility is driven by income and by public opinion about ability. The former is determined by
an agent’s destination class; the latter is inferred by the public, from observable information
7In Section 3.3 that assumption is discussed in greater detail.
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about social mobility. Following Piketty (1998), we write utility as
ui = r (zi) + λPr{A|·}− c (ei) , (1)
with λ the importance of approbation (the status motive), c (ei) the cost of producing
eﬀort ei with the normalization that c (E) = c and c (e) = 0, and r (zi) the income again
normalized so that r (0) = 0 and r (1) = 1. Thus we examine a society in which the income
level in the upper class is fixed, exceeding that in the lower class, regardless of how densely
populated the upper class is.8 Finally Pr{A|·} is the posterior probability placed by society
on i being of high ability conditional on the publicly observable information. The extent to
which society grants positive approbation is exactly equal to the probability that society
thinks the agent is of high ability, scaled by λ. The posterior is determined by Bayes’ rule:
a success, i.e. upwards mobility for low origin people or maintaining the status quo for
high origin people, will strengthen the public belief about one’s ability; a failure weakens
the public belief.
2.2 Mobility
We have assumed there are three traits – ability, origin, eﬀort – and each exerts a positive
influence on the probability that an agent ends up in the upper class. Social mobility is thus
encapsulated in the details of the transition rates Pr{zi = z|ai, `i, ei}, for which it is natural
that high origin, high ability and high eﬀort each independently raises the probability that
an agent moves into, or stays in, the upper class. We adopt a (stochastic) majority rule for
social mobility. An agent moves to (or stays in) the class corresponding to the majority
of his three attributes: origin, ability and eﬀort. Thus the possibility of class change only
arises for high-eﬀort, high-ability lower class (who can move up) and low-eﬀort, low-ability
rich (who can fall).9 Mobility is not deterministic, though: a high-eﬀort, high-ability poor
agent rises with probability u, while a low-eﬀort, low-ability rich agent falls with probability
d, as summarized in Table 1.
Small values of u and d describe a system in which social mobility is low (inertia is
high). Depending on the relative magnitudes of u and d the direction of mobility is aﬀected,
yielding easier upward than downward mobility (u > d) or vice versa (u < d) . Thus u and
d can be seen as capturing the degree of inertia in social structure, the importance of luck
in social mobility, or both. Setting u = d = 1 yields a pure deterministic majority rule
in which possession of at least two high traits implies membership in high society, and
minimum inertia.
One observation here is that for agents of upper class origin, ability and eﬀort are
strategic substitutes (having one attribute implies that the other is not needed), whereas
for agents of lower class origin they are strategic complements (the absence of one attribute
8This assumption is relaxed in Section 4 where we introduce a feedback between class size and income.
9Savage and Egerton (1997) show that high ability high status children are likely to be high status
adults, whereas low ability, low status children are likely to be be low status adults. The probability of
ending in the service (upper) class is equal for low ability/high status children and high ability/low status
children (about 30 percent). Breen and Goldthorpe (1999) show that diﬀerent origin classes have diﬀerent
probabilities of ending in a particular destination class. The diﬀerence falls when we correct for merit,
but it remains that children from lower classes need to show considerably more merit to enter a particular
(higher) class than do higher class children. See also Boudon (1974).
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Ability Origin Eﬀort Social mobility
ai `i ei Pr{zi = 1|ai, `i, ei}
A 1 E 1
A 1 e 1
a 1 E 1
A 0 E u
a 1 e 1− d
A 0 e 0
a 0 E 0
a 0 e 0
Table 1: The probabilistic mechanism driving social mobility.
implies that there is no value in acquiring the other). This diﬀerence arises because of the
inertia in mobility arising from class origin.
3 Status, dynasties and meritocracy
Inferences about ability and thus optimal behaviour are aﬀected by what is public and
what is private knowledge. We will focus on the case in which an individual knows both his
ability and his eﬀort, but neither is publicly observable. By contrast social mobility, which
serves as a signal of ability, is publicly observable. We begin this section with equilibrium
behaviour determination and then turn to the evolution of social structure. We finally
discuss alternative information regimes and the assumptions of the model.
3.1 Equilibrium eﬀort levels
As eﬀort is not observable, we must define public beliefs about individuals’ eﬀort levels.
As agents know their own abilities, there are four types of agents: upper and lower class
origin, crossed with high and low ability levels. Society’s beliefs about eﬀort are therefore
characterized by a 4-tuple: q = (q0,A, q0,a, q1,A, q1,a), where qi,j is the probability that an
individual of origin i and ability j puts in high eﬀort. With beliefs characterised this
way, we define society’s posterior as Pr{A|`i, zi; q}. Application of Bayes’ Rule gives that
posterior beliefs about low origin agents are
Pr{A|0, 1; q} =
½
0, q0,A = 0,
1, q0,A > 0,
Pr{A|0, 0; q} = p− puq0,A
1− puq0,A
.
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Similarly for high origin agents the posteriors are
Pr{A|1, 0; q} = 0,
Pr{A|1, 1; q} = p
1− d (1− p) (1− q1,a)
.
Note that social movement makes a definitive signal regardless of parameters, whereas
posteriors about agents who do not change class are aﬀected by the model’s parameters.
The negative externality induced by approbation seeking shows in ∂ Pr{A|0, 0; q}/∂q0,A and
∂ Pr{A|1, 1; q}/∂q1,a both being negative.
Agents act as risk-neutral utility maximizers, simply comparing expected utilities. For
high-ability lower class agents
EU0,A =
½
u (1 + λPr{A|0, 1; q}) + (1− u)λPr{A|0, 0; q}− c, ei = E,
λPr{A|0, 0; q}, ei = e.
The other three cases unfold similarly. Defining ∆i,j to be the diﬀerence in expected utility
between high and low eﬀort for individuals of origin i and ability j, we can write the
incentives towards high eﬀort as
∆0,A = u+ λ
u (1− p)
1− pq0u
− c,
∆1,a = d+ λ
dp
1− d (1− q1,a) (1− p)
− c,
∆0,a = −c < 0,
∆1,A = −c < 0.
(2)
Low-origin low-ability and high-origin high-ability agents never have incentives to provide
high eﬀort, whatever the belief system q. On the other hand both high-origin low-ability
and low-origin high-ability agents prefer high eﬀort over some parameter range(s). In a
world in which utility is driven purely by income (λ = 0), the previous expressions simplify
to∆0,A = u−c and∆1,a = d−c. As we are interested in the case in which social approbation
creates motivation for people who otherwise would not expend high eﬀort, it is assumed in
what follows that c ≥ max{u, d}. In other words, we assume that income eﬀects alone are
not enough to induce high eﬀort.
To close the model we impose rational expectations, and look for equilibria in q. This
gives four critical values: λ0, Λ0, λ1, Λ1. If λ > Λ0 lower class agents give high eﬀort; if
λ < λ0 lower class agents give low eﬀort; for λ > Λ1, high class agents give high eﬀort;
and for λ < λ1, high class agents give low eﬀort. From (2), consistency implies that
q0,a = q1,A = 0, i.e. the only equilibrium for low-origin, low-ability agents and high-origin,
high-ability agents is to give low eﬀort. Substituting the appropriate q0,A = 1 and q0,A = 0
into ∆0,A yields
Λ0 =
c− u
u (1− p) (1− pu) , (3)
λ0 =
c− u
u (1− p) . (4)
For low origin agents, when Λ0 ≤ λ ≤ λ0, multiple equilibria exist: both low and high
eﬀort can be optimal for high ability low class individuals as a group. The multiplicity
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eﬀect that arises here for intermediate values of λ is the same as in Piketty (1998). Two
opposite opinions are possible in this parameter region: the view that lack of promotion
expresses lack of talent, versus the view that lack of promotion merely reflects bad luck.
Making the equivalent substitutions for high origin agents gives
λ1 =
c− d
pd
(1− d (1− p)) , (5)
Λ1 =
c− d
pd
. (6)
For λ1 < λ < Λ1 upper class agents do not act monolithically, rather only a proportion
q∗1,a ∈ (0, 1) provide high eﬀort. Solving ∆1,a (q1,a) = 0 yields
q∗1,a ≡ q∗ = 1 +
λp
(c− d) (1− p) −
1
d (1− p) ,
which satisfies q∗ (λ1) = 0 and q
∗ (Λ1) = 1. Optimal eﬀort levels in relation to the strength
of the approbation motive λ are summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Equilibrium eﬀort levels.
• For low-origin agents:
q∗0,A =



0 λ < Λ0,
{0, 1} Λ0 ≤ λ ≤ λ0,
1 λ > λ0.
• For high origin agents:
q∗1,a =



0 λ < λ1,
q∗ λ1 ≤ λ ≤ Λ1,
1 λ > Λ1.
Proof. Straightforward from the definitions and the expressions in Equation (2).
When approbation is little valued, eﬀort levels are low, and the opposite happens when
approbation is highly valued. In intermediate regions, for high-origin agents, a non-extreme
proportion of low-ability agents provide high eﬀort; whereas for low-origin agents there are
multiple equilibria: either all high-ability agents provide high eﬀort, or they all provide low
eﬀort.
The eﬀects of the parameters of the model are easily seen. Dropping ability subscripts,
we focus on the potentially mobile sub-classes: high-ability poor and low-ability rich. Not
surprisingly, the incentives towards high eﬀort are increasing with the approbation motive
in both social classes: ∂∆0/∂λ, ∂∆1/∂λ > 0. Regarding the public belief about high eﬀort
we have ∂∆0/∂q0 > 0 and ∂∆1/∂q1 < 0, which explains multiple equilibria in the lower class
and the interior equilibrium in the upper. The derivatives of the roots with respect to the
stochastic components of social mobility u and d are all negative, as increasing mobility
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(u or d) gives high eﬀort a higher expected return. Finally regarding p, the prevalence
of high ability, the eﬀects are ∂∆0/∂p < 0 and ∂∆1/∂p > 0. If I am lower class and
high-ability, and almost everyone is low-ability (as would be implied by a low p), I gain a
lot of prestige by signalling my high ability. When everyone is high-ability, on the other
hand, the fact that I signal my ability will not make a large diﬀerence in terms of prestige
since I am already “presumed” to be high-ability. High eﬀort is thus less attractive. For
low-ability high society agents things are reversed: if almost everyone in the population is
high-ability and I fail to remain high society, I lose a lot of prestige because society easily
identifies me as low-ability. When everyone is low ability on the other hand high eﬀort is
less attractive. Thus to induce high eﬀort, a stronger approbation motive is needed for the
poor if high-ability is common, whereas the opposite holds for the rich: ∂λ0/∂p, ∂Λ0/∂p > 0
and ∂λ1/∂p, ∂Λ1/∂p < 0.
It follows from Proposition 1 that if Λ0 ≤ λ ≤ λ1 we can have a situation in which
the poor strive to rise, and the rich let chance determine their fates. Such a situation has
visible meritocratic elements as the combination of talent and eﬀort exists and is rewarded;
however it only applies to the low class. Society views success as signalling ability rather
than mere chance, and self made men enjoy approbation. On the other hand, if Λ1 ≤ λ ≤ λ0
the poor give up their aspirations and the rich work to maintain their position. In this
situation society is strongly dynastic, with family lines occupying the same social class
for ever and no lower class individual ever rising. There society validates the view that
social ascension is despicable. In the next section we study the long run implications of
individuals’ optimal decisions.
3.2 The evolution of social structure
Observation of modern societies shows not only that individuals move from one class to
another, but also that the overall structure of classes continually changes over time.10 We
study that issue in the overlapping structure that has been set forth, with social class being
inherited without error. Social structure will evolve as a discrete time process with eﬀort
levels determining social movements, and the resulting structure being considered in the
next generation’s decisions regarding eﬀort provision. Let x(t) be the measure of the upper
class at time t and define x as the stationary (long run) measure of high society. We can
then state the following.
Proposition 2 Consider three cases, determined by the equilibrium behaviour of the upper
class.
• Suppose λ < λ1, i.e. low eﬀort is optimal for low-ability high-origin agents.
x =



0 λ < Λ0,n
0, x∗ = up
up+d(1−p)
o
Λ0 ≤ λ ≤ λ0,
x∗ = up
up+d(1−p) λ ≥ λ0.
10See Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) for example.
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• Suppose Λ1 < λ, i.e. high eﬀort is optimal for low-ability high-origin agents.
x =



x(0) λ < Λ0,
{1, x(0)} Λ0 ≤ λ ≤ λ0,
1 λ ≥ λ0.
• Suppose λ1 ≤ λ ≤ Λ1, i.e. a share q∗ of low-ability high-origin agents provides high
eﬀort.
x =



0 λ < Λ0,n
0, x∗∗ = up
up+d(1−p)(1−q∗)
o
Λ0 ≤ λ ≤ λ0,
x∗∗ = up
up+d(1−p)(1−q∗) λ ≥ λ0.
Proof. If the low-ability high origin agents give low eﬀort, they exit from the upper
class, causing the upper class to decline at a rate −(1− p)d. If the high-ability low origin
agents give high eﬀort, they enter the upper class at a rate (1/x − 1)pu. If only the first
motion exists (when λ < λ1 and λ < Λ0) then the only steady state of the system is x = 0.
When only the second motion exists, each period the upper class grows, and in the limit
x = 1 is the only steady state of the system. When both motions exists, then the rate of
change is (1/x− 1)pu− (1− p)d which has a fixed point at x = x∗ = up/ (up+ (1− p) d).
As the slope of the map at that point is less than one x∗ is stable. In the intermediate
range Λ1 ≤ λ ≤ λ1 the upper class only decreases at a rate −(1− p) (1− q∗) d, hence the
result. The diﬀerent cases follow quite simply from these components.
Results both on eﬀort levels and social structure are encapsulated by critical values
λ0,Λ0,λ1 and Λ1 which, under diﬀerent parameter values, occupy diﬀerent positions along
the approbation motive axis. There are, however, essentially two general cases: when
the lower class thresholds are below the upper class ones, and vice versa. Which sit-
uation obtains depends on the prevalence of high ability. As ∂λ0/∂p, ∂Λ0/∂p > 0 and
∂λ1/∂p, ∂Λ1/∂p < 0 the first situation Λ0 < λ0 < λ1 < Λ1 obtains when talent is rare
(p low) whereas the second situation λ1 < Λ1 < Λ0 < λ0 is associated with talent being
common (p high). The results from Propositions 1 and 2 are summarized in Figure 1 for
the two polar orderings mentioned above.11
Consider first the extreme cases of very weak or very strong approbation motives. When
approbation motives are weak all agents give low eﬀort and the less able members of the
upper class (of which each generation has a share 1 − p) continually move down to join
the lower class. We have a social system that behaves like a decaying dynasty. Eventually,
by this attrition, the upper class is reduced to zero and while agents continue to value
approbation, the concern for status is no longer manifest since there is no social mobility.
By contrast, when status matters a lot, everyone gives high eﬀort, and the upper class has a
dynastic component (no one leaves it) but is continuously entered by lower class high-ability
strivers (of which each generation has a share p), yielding a diluted dynasty. Here there
11The three other possible orderings of the roots along the approbation axis yield situations which are
similar to but slightly more intricate than the two we present.
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Figure 1: Social organization as the approbation motive is varied.
is a combination of dynastic and meritocratic elements in the social structure. Eventually,
though, everyone becomes a member of the upper class and again approbation-seeking
ceases to be relevant. The intermediate cases display a richer behaviour.
For intermediate λ-values, we can first observe situations in which both up and down
social mobility take place (low p, upper part in Figure 1). Turmoil in the social structure
has meritocratic elements, as high-ability lower class workers rise, and low-ability upper
class shirkers fall (λ1 > λ > Λ0). (It is only weakly a meritocracy as high-ability shirkers
do not fall out of the upper class.) For this to happen it must be the case that high
ability is relatively rare. Thus only when approbation is granted for rare traits will a
meritocratic society be observed. On the other hand, again in the middle ground, we
can get situations with a completely frozen social structure in which pure dynasties exist
(Λ1 < λ < Λ0). This occurs when high ability is common (high p, lower part in Figure
1). Thus when approbation is granted for common traits, even though promotion and
demotion mechanisms are inherently meritocratic, society does not look like a meritocracy
but rather like an archetypal dynasty.
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3.3 Discussion
Do the informational constraints bearing on the agents significantly aﬀect the behaviour
of the system? Some types of abilities may be diﬃcult even for the agent to observe, and
some types of eﬀort may be more obvious than others. Thus in principle there are four
possible information settings: the observability of eﬀort crossed with the observability of
ability. Simply by re-doing the above calculations under diﬀerent information regimes, it
can be observed that as knowledge asymmetries decrease, the strength of the approbation
motive needed to induce high eﬀort increases. It becomes more diﬃcult to induce a change
of public perception of ability through social mobility. In the extreme case where public
and private knowledge is identical, involving knowledge of eﬀort and ignorance of ability,
no finite utility from approbation is high enough to induce any agent to high eﬀort. Which
of the two intermediate knowledge regimes12 is more conducive to high eﬀort depends on
the other parameters (the levels of mobility u and d and the prevalence of high ability).
Regarding the eﬀect of u and d, symmetric upward and downward mobility (u = d)
imply that pure dynasties exist only when high ability is common (p > 1/2) while weak
meritocracy exists only when high ability is uncommon (p < 1/2). To look at asymmetric
mobility, fix u and denote p∗ = arg{Λ1 = λ0} the value of p at which a dynastic regime can
appear (recall meritocracy demands λ > Λ0 and λ < Λ1). Diﬀerentiation yields ∂p∗/∂d < 0,
i.e. increasing the relative ease of downwards mobility increases the range of p-values
compatible with pure dynasties. Now denote p∗ = arg{Λ0 = λ1} the value of p at which a
meritocracy can emerge. Again ∂p∗/∂d < 0, thus increasing the relative ease of downwards
mobility diminishes the range of p-values compatible with weak meritocracy. As downward
mobility becomes stronger, observing a dynastic structure becomes more likely. Turning
to the stationary roots, as one would expect, the size of the upper class decreases with the
relative ease of downward mobility (∂x∗/∂d < 0). The eﬀect of u is naturally the opposite.
(In addition, almost everywhere ∂x∗/∂p > 0, i.e. the size of the upper class increases with
the prevalence of high ability) Also note that having u > d implies that x∗ > p, while if
d > u then x∗ < p. Put in words, if upward mobility is (relatively) easy, then the high class
will accommodate all of the high-ability agents, and some of the low-ability well-born. If
upward mobility is (relatively) diﬃcult, then high-ability low-origin agents cannot rise, and
the upper class does not contain all of the high-ability agents in the population.
We have assumed above that ability was distributed independently across agents. This
is a relatively strong assumption, however, as one might think that ability is correlated
either with origin class, or with parental ability.
The first case, in which ability is (positively) correlated with birth class, can be readily
accommodated in the model. Letting the probabilities of high ability diﬀer for the two
classes by introducing p0 and p1 in Equation 2 changes the critical values of λ and thereby
changes the relative sizes of the regions in Figure 1. In terms of the evolution of social
structure, the rates at which classes change depend on both p0 and p1. When there is only
attrition or growth the steady states at 0 and 1 are preserved. When both classes display
in and out flows the fixed points x∗ and x∗∗ now have values which depend on p0 and p1.
12The two intermediate regimes are public and private ignorance of ability with public ignorance but
private knowledge of eﬀort; and public and private knowledge about eﬀort with public ignorance and
private knowledge about ability.
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Modulo that diﬀerence the system displays the same qualitative behaviour.
The case in which individual ability is correlated with parental ability is slightly more
complicated. Studying it precisely demands keeping track of the measure of high ability
individuals in each class as they change in time. The proportion of high ability agents in
each class is no longer constant (p), but changes from period to period. This implies that
the critical λ values will change over time. For large or small values of λ this does not cause
particular problems, as either all potentially mobile agents work (and rise) or none do (and
fall). While this changes the proportion of high ability agents in the origin classes, the
implied movements in critical λ values does not change optimal behaviour. Diﬃculties in
analysing the dynamics arise, however, when λ is near the initial critical values. Changing
proportions of high ability agents in the two classes can change critical values such that
the optimal behaviour for particular types of agents changes from one period to the next.13
4 Social competition
In the exposition so far we have assumed that the size of the upper class has no eﬀect on
the income of its members (r(0) = 0 and r(1) = 1). But competition for places in the
upper class is a common feature of modern societies.14 The simplest way to incorporate
a form of competition in our model is to assume that the income of upper class members
is a function of the class size.15 We assume that each new entrant to high society inflicts
a negative income externality on the other members, so the attractiveness of the upper
class club falls as it grows in size.16 In this setting the income in the upper class is a
decreasing function ξ of the measure x of individuals who belong to it. Thus in addition
to the negative externality induced by approbation-seeking, there is also a “real” income
eﬀect.
Incentives for high eﬀort in this case are identical to those in the previous setting with
the exception that income in the upper class is ξ(x) rather than 1. Following Equations 2,
13Take the case of perfect correlation, assuming low ability is rare and the approbation motive is low,
i.e. λ ≤ Λ0 < λ0 < λ1 < Λ1. All individuals expend low eﬀort. Supposing that initially the measure of
high ability is p in both classes, after the first period only high ability remain in the upper class and the
share of high ability in the lower class becomes px/ (x+ (1− p) (1− x)) < p. As ∂λ0/∂p, ∂Λ0/∂p > 0 the
critical λ for the lower class are shifted left. Thus now high eﬀort can become an equilibrium for the high
ability poor.
14See for example Hirsch (1976) or Frank(1985b).
15We should acknowledge here that this does not constitute competition for approbation. The value of
approbation is not aﬀected by the number of people receiving it. But as utility is additive in income and
approbation, this remains a simple way to introduce the feedback from social structure to eﬀort levels.
16There are several possible reasons for a decrease in income with class size. If the class is correlated
with professions, a simple market eﬀect implies that an increase in the number of professionals (doctors,
lawyers and so on) will drive the wage premium down. In some places this is institutionalized: in French
medical school for example, there is a numerus clausus applied at the end of the first year of study. Eﬀort
applied to enter the first year class can be wasted, and so the expected value of it falls as the number
doing so increases. An alternative interpretation could be to consider there is a taste for distinction, which
lowers the attractiveness of high society: competition between the wannabes and the incumbents results
in lower payoﬀs for everyone.
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we can write these incentives for our four types of agents directly as:
∆0,A = uξ (x) + λu
1− p
1− pq0,Au
− c,
∆1,a = dξ (x) + λ
dp
1− d (1− q1,a) (1− p)
− c,
∆0,a = −c < 0,
∆1,A = −c < 0.
(7)
As in the previous section, the only equilibrium for low-origin, low-ability agents and high-
origin, high-ability agents is to give low eﬀort. For the other two types, we again look for
rational expectations equilibria. In a world without approbation we get ∆0,A = uξ (x)− c
and ∆1,a = dξ (x)− c, so we assume that c ≥ max{uξ (0) , dξ (0)}.
4.1 Equilibrium eﬀort levels
Proceeding analogously to the previous section, we now define four critical values of the
size of the upper class (x0,X0, x1,X1) as follows:
if x < X0 then lower class agents give high eﬀort,
if x > x0 then lower class agents give low eﬀort,
if x < X1 then upper class agents give high eﬀort,
if x > x1 then upper class agents give low eﬀort.
In contrast to the exposition in Section 3.1, the results are not stated in terms of the
approbation motive, but rather in terms of the measure of the upper class. The focus here
is on the interaction between social structure and individual incentives, i.e. how social
mobility aﬀects and is aﬀected by the composition of society. Using these definitions and
Equations 7 we can write the critical values as follows.
Proposition 3 The critical sizes of the upper class with social competition are
x0 = ξ
−1
³ c
u
− λ (1− p)
´
,
X0 = ξ
−1
µ
c
u
− λ 1− p
1− pu
¶
,
X1 = ξ
−1
³ c
d
− λp
´
,
x1 = ξ
−1
µ
c
d
− λ p
1− (1− p) d
¶
.
Proof. Assuming parameter values such that the four roots belong to [0, 1], these
follow directly from substituting q0,A and a1,a into ∆0,A and ∆1,a. When only some of the
roots belong to [0, 1], the discussion reduces to sub-cases of those discussed in the following
paragraph.
Note that as both expressions in Equation (7) are strictly decreasing with x, all critical
values, provided they belong to [0, 1], are unique. For the roots to belong to [0, 1] it must
be the case that ∆0 (0, 1) ,∆1 (0, 0) > 0 and ∆0 (1, 0) ,∆1 (1, 1) < 0. For low origin agents,
14
when x0 ≤ x ≤ X0, multiple equilibria exist: both low and high eﬀort can be optimal
for high ability low class individuals as a group. When X1 ≤ x ≤ x1, a non-extreme
proportion of upper class low-ability agents produces high eﬀort. Solving ∆1,a = 0 gives
that proportion as
q∗ (x) = 1− 1
d (1− p) +
λp
(1− p) (c− dξ (x)) . (8)
In the presence of social competition the optimal eﬀort levels are dependent on the measure
of the upper class. In this case the dynamics of the class structure become interesting as
incentives to high eﬀort can change over time as the upper class grows or shrinks. The
presence of critical values of x at which incentives, and thus behaviour, change implies that
the iterated map describing the evolution of x is piecewise defined, as is illustrated below.
4.2 The evolution of social structure
As in Section 3.2, we have a structure in which agents’ origin class is inherited without
error from their parents. In addition we have introduced an interdependence in income
across individuals. One possible way of determining equilibrium behaviour could be to
again impose rational expectations as the equilibrium concept. However solving directly
for the rational expectations equilibrium prevents us from examining dynamics. Thus, since
we are interested in society’s evolution and in the (presumably) richer dynamics that the
existence of a feedback from social structure to eﬀort levels generates, we make the simple
assumption that individuals’ beliefs about class size are myopic. Changes in structure are
determined by equilibrium eﬀort levels, which are in turn based upon the class structure
left by previous generations. This is a reasonable assumption if u and d are small, for in
this case social structure evolve slowly as only a small proportion of those fit to change
classes will in fact do so. Thus under this expectation structure, individuals base their
eﬀort decisions on the assumption that the class structure will remain unchanged through
their lifetimes. This permits us to ask whether cycles in the social structure could emerge.
The presence of multiple equilibria complicates the exposition quite significantly, so
we make the simplifying assumption that in the region [x0,X0] of multiple equilibria for
the high ability lower class, high eﬀort is selected. With this tie-breaking rule, only three
regimes are possible. These are driven by p, since the critical values of x respond to changes
in p: ∂X0/∂p < 0 while ∂x1/∂p, ∂X1/∂p > 0.
The dynamics of the system can be captured in a straightforward way be defining
separately the rates of up and down mobility. Define q˜1(x) as
q˜1(x) =



0 x > x1,
q∗ (x) X1 ≤ x ≤ x1,
1 x < X1,
and similarly
q˜0(x) =
½
0 x > X0,
1 x ≤ X0.
Now for any x, the rate of change from down mobility is equal to D = (1− p)d(1− q˜1(x)),
whereas up mobility is defined as U = (1/x − x)puq˜0(x). The rate of change in x is then
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simply U−D. From this and the definition of q∗ (x) in Equation 8, three propositions follow
straightforwardly.
Proposition 4 With a high public belief in individual ability, equilibrium is characterized
by labouring rich, work-shy poor and a dynastic class structure with the upper class of any
measure between X0 and X1.
Proposition 5 With an intermediate public belief in the likelihood of high individual abil-
ity, there are two possibilities. Equilibrium is characterized by either labouring poor, lazy
rich and a non-dynastic upper class of measure x∗∗ = argx{up (1/x− 1) = (1− q∗ (x)) (1−
p)d} if x∗∗ < X0. When x∗∗ > X0 equilibrium is characterized by the absence of stationary
class structures and individual eﬀort levels, with the measure of the upper class cycling
around X0.
Proposition 6 With a low public belief in the likelihood of high individual ability, there
are three possibilities. Equilibrium is characterized by labouring poor, lazy rich and a non-
dynastic upper class of measure x∗∗ if X1 < x
∗∗ < x1. The same form of social organization
prevails with an upper class of measure x∗ = up/ (up+ (1− p) d) if x1 < x∗ < X0. Finally
cycles obtain around X0 if none of the previous equilibria exists in the relevant intervals.
In the following paragraphs we discuss these propositions more in detail and illustrate
them with a simple example. In this example we set the basic parameters of the model
as follows: costs of eﬀort, c = 0.2, probability of up and down mobility, u = d = 0.1,
the utility value of approbation λ = 2.5, and finally the function mapping the size of the
upper class into its income, ξ(x) = (1 − x)2. The three sections that follow illustrate the
propositions by introducing diﬀerent values of p, and generating the iterated map of x.
4.2.1 Common high ability
Assume first that high ability is so common that the roots are ordered as X0 < X1 <
x1. Specifically, in the example described above, set p = 0.6. The map representing the
evolution of high society is given in Figure 2.
There is a discontinuity at X0, then a continuum of stationary points between X0 and
X1. Two other distinct segments exists: between X1 and x1 and finally above x1. The
process will rest at some point between X0 and X1, depending on initial conditions. Note
that the measure of possible equilibria is increasing with society’s belief in the likelihood
of high ability: X0 decreases with p while X1 increases with p.
If high ability is widespread, a striving upper class (whose members thus never expe-
rience downwards social mobility) and a work-shy lower class (whose members thus never
move upwards) coexist, and the stable measure of the upper class can take any value be-
tween X0 and X1. Society is segmented into two groups between which no one travels.
Social structure, and therefore the income distribution, is frozen.
4.2.2 Intermediate prevalence of high ability
Assume now that high ability is moderately prevalent, so that the roots are ordered as
X1 < X0 < x1. In this case there are social structures (values of x) such that high society
remains attractive to poor people while it has stopped being so for rich people.
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Figure 2: The map describing the evolution of the upper class in the example with high
prevalence of high ability (p = 0.6) and the roots ordered as X0 < X1 < x1.
With intermediate amounts of high ability the set of stationary states shrinks to a point,
which is characterized by systematic changes in class composition: low origin individuals
continually move into the upper class through high eﬀort, and upper class members rely
on luck to stay there, and so continually fall. Depending on the parameter values it is
also possible that no stationary point exists, in which case cycles obtain. To illustrate, set
p = 0.507 in the example. In this case the map representing the evolution of high society
is given in Figure 3.
There is a first change in the slope at X1, before a discontinuity at X0. A third piece
exists between X0 and x1 and finally the last part of the map to the right of x1. From the
proposition we know that two cases are possible. Either the crossing takes place betweenX1
and X0 and then a unique stationary point obtains, or the crossing is not in that segment
and we have no stationary point. The illustration is of the latter type. Left of X0 the upper
class tends to grow while right of X0 it tends to shrink. As a result the measure of high
society cycles around X0 and never settles down.
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4.2.3 Rare High Ability
Suppose now that p is low enough so that the roots are ordered as X1 < x1 < X0. The
resulting situation is similar to the previous one as it also presents the possibility that no
17For these parameter values the system settles into a six-period cycle, with x =
( 0.2004, 0.1905, 0.1811, 0.1727, 0.1664, 0.1616, . . . ).
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Figure 3: The map describing the evolution of the upper class in the example with inter-
mediate prevalence of high ability (p = 0.507) and the roots ordered as X1 < X0 < x1.
stationary structure exists.
The stationary state is again characterized by systematic changes in class composition,
with low origin individuals rising through expenditure of eﬀort, and the upper class again
relying on luck to stay there, and so typically falling. Cycles also exist in which society
never settles down. In the example set p = 0.41. The map representing the evolution of
high society is given in Figure 4.
Figure 4 and Figure 3 yield the same conclusion. This time in Figure 4 though there
are two changes in the slope of the map, at X1 and x1, before the discontinuity at X0 and
then a final new piece of the map. The example here has no stationary measure of high
society as left of X0 the upper class tends to grow while right of X0 it tends to shrink. As
a result cycles obtain.18
4.3 Welfare
Consider total utility as the measure of social welfare. Given that low-ability poor and
high-ability rich are immobile, it is not surprising that their maximum contribution to
social welfare obtains when they expend low eﬀort. This is both privately and socially
optimal. The maximal total contribution of the high-ability rich and the low-ability poor
is xp (ξ (x) + λ) + (1− x) (1− p)λp. The cases of the high-ability poor and low-ability
18For these parameter values, the stationary cycle is x = ( 0.3083, 0.3184, 0.3276, . . . ).
18
00.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
X x X
x
Figure 4: The map describing the evolution of the upper class in the example with low
prevalence of high ability (p = 0.41) and the roots ordered as X1 < x1 < X0.
rich need more care. When the high-ability poor expend high eﬀort, their contribution
to social welfare is (1− x) p [u (ξ (x) + λ) + (1− u)λp (1− u) / (1− pu)− c]. Similarly, if
they expend low eﬀort: (1− x) pλp. Thus socially optimal switching from low to high eﬀort
should take place if
λ > λ∗0 =
c− uξ (x)
u (1− p)2
(1− pu) .
Similarly the low-ability high origin agents’ contribution to welfare when they produce high
eﬀort is x (1− p) (ξ (x) + λp− c) while for low eﬀort it is x (1− p) (1− d) (ξ (x) + λp/ [1− d (1− p)]) .
Thus socially optimal switching from low to high eﬀort should take place if
λ > λ∗1 =
c− ξ (x) d
dp2
(1− d (1− p)) .
It is easily seen that λ∗0 > λ0 and λ
∗
1 > Λ1, i.e. there is a non-zero measure of λ values in
which agents produce high eﬀort while social optimality demands low eﬀort. This is true
both of the lower class (this stems from the tie-breaking assumption of high eﬀort in the
region [x0, X0] of multiple equilibria) and for the upper class (a measure q
∗ (x) of them
provides E). As a result, in this region of λ values, for any class structure x (including the
stationary ones) more eﬀort than socially optimal is provided, thus approbation-seeking
results in a waste, the magnitude of which decreases with u and d. The extent of this
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over-provision, as measured by the ratios λ∗0/λ0 and λ
∗
1/Λ1 changes with the prevalence of
high ability: as high ability becomes more common, the region (of λ) of over-provision by
the upper class falls, whereas the region of over-provision by the lower class increases .19
The diﬀerence between social and private optimality arises because of two externalities that
eﬀort imposes on others. First, due to the application of Bayes’ Rule, there is a competition
for approbation, implying that if an agent switches from low to high eﬀort he reduces the
probability that other agents are considered high ability. Consequently others receive less
approbation. Second, since high eﬀort is a route into the upper class, expenditures of eﬀort
increase the size of the upper class, and thus reduce the income of everyone in it. As these
are external eﬀects, eﬀort will, in general be over-supplied.
5 Conclusion
Although the prestige from being considered a talented person does not really aﬀect one’s
economic well-being, it is something we tend to value positively. What I wear, which car
I drive and where I spend my week-ends can all be considered correlated with ability, but
probably a more revealing signal is my social mobility, as measured by my educational or
professional achievement relative to that of my parents. The model developed here is about
how individual utility maximization aﬀects social structure and social dynamics, and about
how the system of social mobility self-regulates.
In the model, an inherent concern for social approbation (a concern for status, if status
is determined by ranking on the scale of approbation) is transformed into an instrumental
concern for social class. It is not simply class per se, however, in the sense in which
approbation arises from class in an aristocracy. Rather, it is a concern for what we have
termed “destination class”. That is, the class an agent is in after mobility has taken place.
Comparing origin and destination class is what permits public inference about the trait on
which approbation is determined. Thus it is mobility between classes (or lack of it) rather
than the class into which one is born that matters for our agents. Because mobility is a
source of well-being to individuals and they actively seek it, social structure changes over
time and we study the types of organizations that emerge.
One striking result that emerges is that in spite of the fact that social mobility is
determined purely on meritocratic principles, a dynastic social structure can emerge. One
of the over-arching concerns in empirical studies of social mobility is the extent to which
a society is “meritocratic”.20 This debate is conducted by examining diﬀerent empirical
measures of mobility between social classes. But our results suggest that the issue may
be more subtle. Is a society meritocratic if it has the right kind of mobility? Or is it
meritocratic if it has the right kind of incentives? If the latter, it may not be enough to look
at mobility in order to conclude that a society is or is not a meritocracy. When the trait on
which social approbation is granted is relatively common, then a society with meritocratic
incentives will have as its characteristic social “mobility regime”, a pure dynasty. All
children end up in the social class into which they were born. The explanation is that
because everyone is presumed to be of high ability, if a low origin agent rises in social class
19This is seen simply by diﬀerentiating the ratios with respect to p.
20See the debate between Saunders (1997) who finds the UK to be highly meritocratic, and Breen and
Goldthorpe (1999) who do not.
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this has little eﬀect on people’s estimates of his ability, since he was presumed to be high
ability initially. Thus the eﬀort needed to rise in status produces little value in terms of
approbation. On the other hand, if a high origin agent falls, this is an unambiguous signal
that he is of low ability, which will reduce significantly his utility from approbation. Thus
the eﬀort needed to stay in the upper class is worth it. These eﬀects combine to produce
a frozen inter-generational social structure.
Second, in the model we introduce a feedback between the social structure on the one
hand, and eﬀort and social mobility on the other. This implies that eﬀort levels and social
structure are jointly endogenized. From this second feature of the model we get the result
that a multiplicity of dynastic societies can be observed in the long run when the prevalence
of talent is high. Otherwise identical societies can have diﬀerent class structures. On the
other hand, either cycles or a weakly meritocratic stable organization are possible when
talent is not too frequent. The upper class can grow for several periods as lower class
agents work hard to move up, but then there can be a significant fall in its size, when the
upper class gets too big. At this point the income level in the upper class falls below a
threshold, and the upper class agents no longer find it advantageous to expend the eﬀort
to stay there, and there is a big shift in social structure as the low-ability rich abandon
their class through lack of eﬀort.
The model permits an interesting suggestion about how mobility could change over
time. One can imagine that from time to time new approbation traits emerge. Suddenly
something new, ability in mathematics for example, becomes highly esteemed. One would
expect that initially esteem is given to relatively rare traits. When this is the case, social
mobility itself demonstrates meritocratic features. When low ability is presumed (that is
when the approbation trait is rare), then a rise by a low origin agents is an unambiguous
signal of high ability, while the fall of a high origin agent will not change very much the
public opinion of his ability. Thus low origin agents have strong incentives to work hard,
high origin agents have only very weak incentives. High ability, industrious poor advance;
low ability, lazy rich fall, and the mobility “looks meritocratic”. But when a possession of a
trait provides utility, a rational response is to invest. We often see parents forcing children
to invest (typically in education) so they will acquire these rare traits for which approbation
is granted. Rarity falls, and mobility will be reduced, possibly disappearing altogether as
the trait becomes too common and society moves into a frozen dynastic structure. This
changes not only the nature of mobility, but also which part of the population works hard.
Initially it is the striving, high ability poor, eventually it is the defensive, low ability rich. If
upper class income were determined not only by the size of the class but also by the ability
of those earning it, social welfare could increase if high-ability agents populated the upper
class. Thus a shift from an uncommon to common approbation trait, and the consequent
move from a meritocracy to a dynastic structure would have negative implications for social
welfare.
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